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Note
Diversity Jurisdiction and Injunctive Relief:
Using a “Moving-Party Approach” to Value the
Amount in Controversy
Christopher A. Pinahs∗
Consider the following diversity jurisdiction hypothetical:
Happy Apple Orchard is a family-owned apple farm struggling
financially due to a sharp reduction in production. Once a
thriving orchard, warmer than normal temperatures and a lack
of rainfall have made apple growth impossible. The orchard
owner, convinced the uncharacteristic weather is due to human-induced climate change, files for a permanent injunction
to abate emissions from ABC Electric, a nearby coal-fired power
plant. The apple orchard’s lost revenue or reduced property
value are potential ways to value the amount in controversy.1
What result occurs, however, if this plaintiff-centered approach
fails to satisfy the amount in controversy necessary for diversity jurisdiction?2 Can a court consider the defendant’s compliance cost, such as the value of temporarily closing the factory
or installing pollution-mitigation technology, to satisfy the
amount in controversy? The scenario is further complicated if
∗ J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.S. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Department of Plant Biological Sciences;
B.A. 2006, Gustavus Adolphus College. Many thanks to Professor Brad Clary
for helpful advice, editing, and mentorship. My sincere appreciation also belongs to the Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Joe
Hansen, Laura Arneson, and Eva Stensvad. Additionally, I would like to
thank my family and friends for their continued support and encouragement
throughout law school. Finally, no thank you would be complete without acknowledging the assistance provided by my fellow “Dream Team” members.
Copyright © 2011 by Christopher A. Pinahs.
1. See, e.g., Am.’s MoneyLine, Inc. v. Coleman, 360 F.3d 782, 787 (7th
Cir. 2004) (noting that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of
the object to the plaintiff ); Leonard v. Enter. Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 973
(11th Cir. 2002) (same).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000 . . . .”).
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the defendant power plant plans to file a counterclaim for defamation. Can consideration of the value of the counterclaim occur in the threshold evaluation for diversity jurisdiction? Unfortunately, under the current federal jurisdictional framework
the answer to these questions is unclear.
When a plaintiff alleges a sum certain—a set dollar
amount above the jurisdictional threshold—no difficulty arises
in determining eligibility for federal diversity jurisdiction.3 Injunctions, however, are not a sum certain, and courts often
struggle to value this intangible form of relief for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction.4 Even assuming a court is able to estimate such a monetary value, considerable confusion arises
when the matter in controversy differently impacts the parties
involved.5
The federal circuit courts are split regarding the proper injunction valuation technique for diversity jurisdiction. The
“plaintiff-viewpoint rule” considers only the value of the injunction to the plaintiff and is followed in the Second, Third, Fifth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.6 Historically, courts have favored this plaintiff-centered amount-in-controversy determination, but fewer opinions since 1980 have inflexibly endorsed the
plaintiff-viewpoint approach.7 Instead, many contemporary decisions grant jurisdiction if the threshold amount is satisfied
from either the plaintiff ’s or defendant’s viewpoint. The First,

3. See Armistead M. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States
District Court, 38 HARV. L. REV. 733, 734 (1925) (“[C]ases at law present much
less difficulty than those on the equity side of the court.”).
4. See, e.g., Ridder Bros., Inc. v. Blethen, 142 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir.
1944) (noting confusion regarding the proper method to ascertain the jurisdictional amount).
5. See, e.g., Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding the plaintiff ’s estimated benefit of eleven dollars as below the jurisdictional amount and the cost of defendant’s compliance as over the jurisdictional amount); see also Brittain Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000.01
Question: What Is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013,
1015 (1998) (stating that valuing claims for injunctive relief is especially difficult if the parties involved place different values on the same right).
6. See, e.g., Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns &
Elec., Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 219 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994); Kheel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49
(2d Cir. 1972); Mass. State Pharm. Ass’n v. Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc., 431
F.2d 130, 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Scalise v. Nat’l Util. Serv., 120 F.2d 938, 940
(5th Cir. 1941).
7. See 1 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.91[1] (Danielle R. Coquillette et al. eds., 2d ed. 1996).
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Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits employ this
“either-viewpoint technique.”8
Yet another method, the “moving-party approach,” supported by several district court decisions9 and dicta from another court of appeals,10 is a third approach to valuing injunctions.
It values the amount in controversy from the plaintiff’s viewpoint when establishing original jurisdiction and the defendant’s viewpoint in cases brought to the federal courts through
removal jurisdiction.11
The valuation techniques addressed in this Note lack definitive Supreme Court direction. To address the competing valuation frameworks, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2002
in Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley.12 In McCauley, the district
court denied federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the plaintiffs’ individual claims for relief were less than the jurisdictional amount, but the defendant’s cost of compliance was greater.13 The decision to dismiss the case was appealed to the
Supreme Court, principally to determine the viewpoint from
which to value injunctive relief.14 At oral argument, the Court
noted that a decision on the merits would “solve an important
and serious problem of jurisdiction that [was] plaguing the low-

8. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. granted in part sub nom. Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 534 U.S.
1126 (2002), and cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1 (2002); McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline
Co., 595 F.2d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Washington, 593 F.2d 1097,
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, 414 F.2d 311,
314 (1st Cir. 1969); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Lally, 327 F.2d 568, 569 (4th Cir.
1964); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir. 1940).
9. See, e.g., Bedell v. H.R.C. Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732, 736 (E.D. Ky. 1981)
(“[I]t is clear that the requisite jurisdictional amount exists, for the defendant
has already expended more than $400,000 . . . .”); Inman v. Milwhite Co., 261
F. Supp. 703, 708 (E.D. Ark. 1966) (“[W]here federal jurisdiction is invoked by
the party standing to gain or lose more than his adversary the greater gain or
the greater loss should be applied as the criterion of jurisdictional amount.”).
10. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir.
1969) (holding that the party seeking removal has the burden of establishing
the required amount in controversy).
11. Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735; see also 14AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3703, at 562 (4th ed. 2011).
12. 534 U.S. 1126, cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1.
13. See In re Ford, 264 F.3d at 955–56 (discussing the district court’s
holding).
14. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, McCauley, 534 U.S. 1126
(No. 01-896) (noting that the principal issue on appeal was the viewpoint from
which to assess the amount in controversy).
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er courts.”15 The case’s procedural posture led to its dismissal,16
but the grant of certiorari and the Court’s comments, nonetheless, illustrate that pressing ambiguities exist in the current
valuation framework.
This Note argues for adoption of a “moving-party approach” for purposes of satisfying the amount-in-controversy
requirement in diversity jurisdiction claims. Part I introduces
the historical and theoretical basis for diversity and removal
jurisdiction, as well as the current Supreme Court framework
for valuing injunctive relief. Part II examines why the two primary injunction valuation techniques currently employed in
federal circuit courts only partially adhere to the underlying rationale for diversity jurisdiction. Finally, Part III argues for
adoption of the moving-party approach through either a Supreme Court order or legislative amendment. This Note concludes that the most appropriate injunction valuation technique for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is the moving-party
approach because it values the true object of litigation without
overly extending federal jurisdiction.
I. FASHIONING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: EXAMINING THE
RATIONALE FOR CREATING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
The issuance of injunctive relief is left primarily to the
court’s discretion.17 In most cases, judges undertake a balancing of interests and are reluctant to issue an injunction unless
the plaintiff is threatened by an injury for which no legal remedy exists.18 The criteria for granting an injunction does not,
however, confer subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.19 As in
most civil actions, the litigants must plead an independent ba15. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, McCauley, 537 U.S. 1 (No. 01-896)
(per curiam), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/01-896.pdf.
16. See McCauley, 537 U.S. at 2.
17. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312–19 (1982)
(balancing equities in determination of whether to grant an injunction).
18. See Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D.N.J.
1830) (No. 1617) (noting that an injunction should be granted only where
courts cannot “afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages”).
Rule 65 enumerates three forms of injunctive relief—temporary restraining
orders, preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions—but for purposes
of this Note, no distinction is required because courts value these three orders
similarly. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
19. See, e.g., Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City
of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 1980) (“[R]ule 65 [authorizing injunctive relief ] confers no jurisdiction.”).
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sis for asserting federal-question or diversity jurisdiction.20
Thus, when requesting injunctive relief in federal diversity
suits, plaintiffs must show not only that a remedy at law does
not exist, but that the value of the requested injunctive relief is
sufficient to meet the amount-in-controversy determination.
As previously discussed, the circuit courts are split regarding the proper viewpoint from which to make this determination.21 As a means to resolve disagreement, this Part examines
the Framers’ rationale for creating diversity jurisdiction and
discusses Congress’s subsequent actions to limit the number of
diversity claims reaching federal court. Additionally, this Part
discusses the ambiguous state of Supreme Court precedent that
led to competing injunction valuation techniques. More specifically, this Part outlines the history of diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence, noting that diversity jurisdiction was created to
protect litigants against out-of-state biases without turning
federal courts into courts of general jurisdiction.
A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
When fashioning a proper injunction valuation technique,
it is necessary to examine the Framers’ rationale for including
diversity jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution.22 Although diversity jurisdiction traces its origins back to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and has been in place longer than federalquestion jurisdiction,23 some ambiguity exists regarding the rationale for its implementation,24 resulting in disagreement
since the Constitutional Convention.25
The traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction is
that the Framers sought to avoid prejudice against out-of-state
litigants in state courts.26 In Bank of the United States v. De20. 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2941, at 35 (2d ed. 1995).
21. See supra notes 6–11 and accompanying text.
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity . . . between Citizens of different States . . . .”).
23. John J. Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 NW. U. L.
REV. 407, 408 (1956).
24. Martin A. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian
Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1800 (1992).
25. See James William Moore & Donald Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1964) (discussing “sharp attacks” on diversity jurisdiction as far back as the Constitutional Convention).
26. See John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE
L.J. 7, 12 (1963); Redish, supra note 24, at 1800; Hessel E. Yntema & George
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veaux, the Court noted that the goal of diversity jurisdiction is
to “preserve the real equity of citizens throughout the union” in
order to protect against “local prejudices, in particular states.”27
Some judicial scholars, however, question whether protection of out-of-state litigants was the actual rationale for diversity jurisdiction.28 For example, Judge Henry Friendly noted
“that there was little cause to fear that the state tribunals
would be hostile to litigants from other states.”29 Instead, he
argued “that the desire to protect creditors against [state] legislation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the grant
of diversity jurisdiction.”30 In response, however, Chief Justice
Taft posited that protecting creditors and out-of-state litigants
was essentially the same.31 He contended that creditors were
more likely to invest capital in out-of-state jurisdictions if they
were assured the opportunity to litigate free from local biases,
such as in the uniform federal system.32 Thus, it appears protecting out-of-state litigants, from one form of prejudice or
another, is the rationale for implementing diversity jurisdiction.33
In fashioning a proper injunction valuation technique, the
rationale for inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in Article III is of
no more than academic concern if prejudice is no longer
H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV.
869, 870 n.1 (1931) (discussing how diversity jurisdiction is “designed to secure
citizens against discrimination”).
27. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), overruled in part by Louisville C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844);
see also Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias.”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74
(1938) (stating that “[d]iversity of citizenship jurisdiction” prevents “discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State”). But see Joel M.
Feinberg, Establishing Federal Jurisdictional Amount by a Counterclaim, 21
MO. L. REV. 243, 256 (1956) (explaining that hostility to nonresidents is nonexistent today).
28. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41
HARV. L. REV. 483, 497 (1928).
29. Id.; see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347
(1816) (noting that the Constitution presumed “whether rightly or wrongly”
that state allegiances were the rationale for diversity jurisdiction).
30. Friendly, supra note 28, at 496–97.
31. See Parker, supra note 23, at 410.
32. Id.
33. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1460 (2008) (stating that diversity jurisdiction was intended to protect litigants from bias in
states other than their own).
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present. To this end, some scholars propose that increased
“travel and communication have unified the nation and reduced
interstate xenophobia.”34 This does not mitigate the fact, however, that state judges are often elected and “more directly tied
to the community than their federal counterparts,”35 resulting
in potential prejudice favoring in-state well-being.36
The perception of local biases led to numerous empirical
studies examining the prevalence of prejudice against out-ofstate defendants, but the results were mixed.37 The inconclusive nature of these studies, however, is not surprising given
that asking state court judges and prospective jurors if they can
be fair to out-of-state litigants invariably invites unpredictable
results.38 The extent of litigant bias is not entirely clear,39 but
Congress has not chosen to abolish diversity jurisdiction, and

34. Redish, supra note 24, at 1801.
35. Id.; see also RICHARD NEELY, WHY COURTS DON’T WORK 27 (1982) (“In
many states judges run for office and this means they must be members of political parties . . . .”); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1968) (discussing “life tenure, independence, respectable salary, and [the] prestige of the federal bench” as reasons for
high caliber decisions in federal courts).
36. Redish, supra note 24, at 1801; see also David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 339
(1977) (noting that bias may be more prevalent in some jurisdictions than others). But see Feinberg, supra note 27, at 249 (“[T]he original policy basis of diversity jurisdiction, fear of local prejudice against foreign parties, is largely a
fiction today.”).
37. Compare Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and Implications for Reform, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 749, 761
(1980–1981) (citing the “provincialism” of rural areas as creating an out-ofstate bias), and Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction
and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 104
(1980) (noting “fear and local bias” as entering the calculus in forum selection),
and Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in
Virginia, 51 VA. L. REV. 178, 179–84 (1965) (reporting that sixty percent of
responding Virginia attorneys selected a federal forum due to out-of-state bias), with Marvin R. Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. REV. 933, 937–38 (1962) (finding only 4.3
percent of responding Wisconsin lawyers mentioned bias). An additional study
found bias was a regional phenomenon. See Neal Miller, An Empirical Study
of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 407–12 (1992) (finding low levels of bias
against out-of-state litigants in the industrialized Midwest and far-West as
opposed to southern states).
38. Currie, supra note 35, at 5 n.19.
39. Cf. Redish, supra note 24, at 1803 (“The dangers of prejudice may often be subtle, but that only makes them more insidious.”).
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thus injunction valuation should mirror the Framers’ impetus,
preventing out-of-state litigant bias, for Article III inclusion.40
B. CONGRESS CURTAILS DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
Article III diversity jurisdiction opens federal court doors
to diverse claims that satisfy the amount-in-controversy threshold.41 Rather paradoxically, however, it has become an American jurisprudential principle that federal courts are limited in
jurisdiction42 and reticent to hear diversity claims.43
Although Article III permits diversity jurisdiction,44 Congress passed diversity45 and removal statutes46 to limit jurisdiction. The diversity statute limits standing to cases between “citizens of different states . . . where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs.”47 Further, the concept of diversity is restricted by
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, which requires complete diversity—all
parties on one side of the suit must be diverse from all parties
on the other side(s).48
40. See McInnis, supra note 5, at 1024 (“[C]ourts, in analyzing the problem [fashioning an injunction valuation method], should examine the history
and purpose of diversity jurisdiction.”). As recently as the 2010 term, the
Court reiterated the “relevant purposive concern” of diversity jurisdiction as
reducing “prejudice[s] against an out-of-state party.” See Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010).
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
42. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”); see also Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 212–13 (2007) (“Because Congress decides whether federal
courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them.”); Frank, supra note 26, at 9 (“The original federal court jurisdiction was almost entirely permissive; the Congress
was under no obligation to create federal trial courts at all . . . .”).
43. See, e.g., Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 351 (1961) (explaining the increase in controversy requirement from $3000 to $10,000 was to
reduce congestion in the federal courts).
44. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
46. See id. § 1441.
47. Id. § 1332.
48. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806), overruled in part by Louisville C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844)
(“[E]ach distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom are
entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts.”). It should be noted that
not until 1967 did the Court explain that the complete diversity requirement
was statutorily, rather than constitutionally, based. See State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (discussing diversity jurisdiction and how the legislature determined its usage).
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In addition to limiting 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to claims between
diverse citizens, Congress amended this section to classify corporations as citizens of both the state of incorporation and the
principal place of business,49 again limiting the reach of diversity jurisdiction.50 Similarly, Congress has steadily raised the
threshold jurisdictional amount required for diversity jurisdiction. It started at $500 in 1789,51 and has been raised five subsequent times to the current amount of $75,000.52 Although Article III opens the federal courts to diversity claims, Congress
has greatly curtailed eligible cases,53 restricting diversity disputes to those of large monetary value and between completely
diverse citizens.54 It has done largely the same for cases seeking federal jurisdiction through the removal statute.
At first glance, the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, appears to reopen the federal court doors.55 Section 1441(a) allows
“any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction . . . [to] be
removed by the defendant.”56 As stated, however, the statute
applies exclusively to civil actions and is available only to defendants.57 Further, the defendant must file a request for removal within thirty days of receiving the original or amended
complaint and may not remove any action subsequent one year
of the suit commencing.58 Consequently, savvy plaintiffs regu49. Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415.
50. See Redish, supra note 24, at 1804 (discussing how Congress has attempted to limit diversity jurisdiction).
51. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. These increases
have been slightly higher than inflation. See Jaren Casazza, Note, Valuation
of Diversity Jurisdiction Claims in the Federal Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
1280, 1283 n.11 (2004).
52. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1453–54 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the raising of the amount to $2000 in 1887, $3000 in 1911, $10,000 in
1958, $50,000 in 1988, and $75,000 in 1996).
53. See Harold Epstein, Comment, Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Amount
in Injunction Suits in Federal District Courts, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 336, 336 (1936)
(“At no time has Congress seen fit to give the federal District Courts the fullest measure of jurisdiction allowable under the Constitution.”). But see Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (stating that
a purpose of the Act is to “restore the intent of the framers . . . by providing for
Federal court consideration of interstate cases . . . under diversity jurisdiction”).
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) (enumerating a $75,000 amount in controversy minimum and outlining other diversity requirements).
55. Id. § 1441.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 1446(b).
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larly amend their complaint to more than the statutory amount
only after the one-year window has elapsed, thus guaranteeing
their case will be heard in state court.59 Additionally, removal
is not allowed if the action is filed in the home state of the defendant.60 The general tenor of the removal statute is one of
“strict construction,”61 with the federal courts reticent to infringe on general principles of federalism.62
The oft-cited rationale for curtailing diversity jurisdiction
is to prevent the “diversion of judge-power” to “the dullest cases” that result in a clogging of the federal courts.63 Docket control considerations attract commentary, including from the Supreme Court64 and the American Law Institute,65 but have
failed to generate enough support to overturn the diversity
statute altogether. Proponents of diversity jurisdiction counter
that federal courts do not exist for the purpose of clearing their
dockets. Rather, their goal is to create judicial uniformity, to
interpret and enforce federal law, and “to prevent interstate
prejudices and allegiances from balkanizing the nation.”66 Ir59. See Michael W. Lewis, Comedy or Tragedy: The Tale of Diversity Jurisdiction and the One-Year Bar, 62 SMU L. REV. 201, 201–02 (2009) (citing
Omi’s Custard Co. v. Relish This, LLC, No. 04 -cv-861-DRH, 2006 WL
2460573, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2006)) (describing an instance where a plaintiff with a cognizable $3 million claim files a complaint for damages of only
$74,900 and waits for the one-year removal restriction to pass).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (“Any other such action shall be removable only if
none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a
citizen of the State in which the action was brought.”).
61. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941)
(noting both the language of the Act of 1887 and subsequent congressional action as evidence for strict construction of the removal statute); see also Luther
v. Countrywide Homes Loan Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“In general, removal statutes are strictly construed against removal.”).
62. Sheets, 313 U.S. at 108–09 (acknowledging that state power to resolve
controversies may only be abridged by an act of Congress in conformity to the
Judiciary Articles of the Constitution).
63. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141,
144 (1973); see also Shapiro, supra note 36, at 317–18 (advocating that few
cases belong in federal courts).
64. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672 (1950)
(noting the difficulty of making federal judges decide state law cases).
65. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1302, at 124 (1969) (recognizing that
federal courts often offer a speedier trial because of “lesser docket congestion”).
66. Redish, supra note 24, at 1786. Professor Redish argues that restricting diversity claims because of docket concerns is an “‘astrological sign’ approach” because “equally as rational a result would have been achieved by
elimination of all cases brought by those born under the signs Pisces, Leo, and
Virgo.” Id. at 1787.
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respective of its validity, docket control considerations shaped
the current diversity framework67 and, as such, they should be
considered in fashioning a proper injunction valuation method.
C. SUPREME COURT INJUNCTION VALUATION FRAMEWORK
In an action for injunction, it is well settled that the
amount in controversy is measured by the value of the litigated
object.68 What is less clear, however, is how to measure the
value of this litigated object.69 The diversity statute fails to
specify a viewpoint from which to value the amount in controversy,70 and, as such, courts are left to the statute’s historical
underpinnings. Given these seemingly contradictory signals—
opening federal courts to protect out-of-state litigants vis-à-vis
restricting the reach of the diversity and removal statutes to
reduce docket loads71—it is unsurprising that the circuit courts
are split regarding a proper injunction valuation technique.
Unfortunately, attempts by the Supreme Court to clarify this
issue have done little to assuage ambiguity. One judicial scholar even went so far as to describe the Court’s precedent as
reading “more like Delphic riddles than carefully plotted legal
reasoning.”72
The first Supreme Court case addressing the issue was
Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Co. v. Ward, where a steamboat owner sought removal of a bridge over the Mississippi
River.73 The Court upheld jurisdiction between diverse citizens,
stating: “But the want of a sufficient amount of damage having
been sustained to give the federal courts jurisdiction, will not
defeat the remedy, as the removal of the obstruction is the matter of controversy, and the value of the object must govern.”74
Historic syntax aside, the decision provides little in terms of direction. The plaintiff’s steamboat business, the cost of removing
67. See id.
68. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977).
69. See Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. Motorola Commc’ns & Elec.,
Inc., 120 F.3d 216, 218 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Whether courts, in determining the
amount in controversy, are to measure the value of the object of the litigation
solely from the plaintiff ’s perspective or whether they may also consider the
value of the object from the defendant’s perspective is considerably less wellestablished.”).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
71. See infra Part II.A–B.
72. McInnis, supra note 5, at 1039.
73. Miss. & Mo. R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 491–92 (1863).
74. Id. at 492.
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the bridge, or the plaintiff’s right to be free of obstruction all fit
the Court’s “value of the object” inquiry,75 so it is no wonder
Ward has left subsequent courts without clear direction.76
The Court again tried to clarify the injunction valuation
framework in Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light,
Heat & Power Co.77 In this case, the plaintiff electric company
sought to enjoin a rival company from erecting poles and wires
that interfered with its business activities.78 The trial court
dismissed the case after determining that the defendant’s cost
of removing the poles was less than the jurisdictional amount,79
but the Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the plaintiff’s
right to operate, exclusive of defendant’s interference, exceeded
the jurisdictional threshold.80
Glenwood seemingly supports a plaintiff-centered approach, but its holding and numerous other cases cited as support for the plaintiff-viewpoint technique81 fail to foreclose the
possibility that jurisdiction is present if the value to the defendant is greater than the statutory requirement.82 No Supreme
Court decisions reject subject-matter jurisdiction when the
statutorily prescribed amount in controversy is satisfied from
the defendant’s viewpoint, and only a case of this character can
conclusively establish the plaintiff viewpoint approach.83
Advocates for an either-viewpoint framework cite Smith v.
Adams.84 The Smith Court enumerated the amount in contro-

75. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 541.
76. Judge Learned Hand noted that Ward is “at best ambiguous.” See
M&M Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 186 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir. 1950).
77. 239 U.S. 121 (1915).
78. Id. at 122–24.
79. Id. at 125.
80. Id. at 126 (“The District Court erred in testing the jurisdiction by the
amount that it would cost defendant to remove its poles and wires . . . . Complainant sets up a right to maintain and operate its plant and conduct its
business free from wrongful interference by defendant. This right is alleged to
be of a value in excess of the jurisdictional amount . . . .”).
81. Armistead Dobie, a Fourth Circuit judge, relied upon Western &
A.R.R. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U.S. 264 (1923), Bitterman v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 207 U.S. 205 (1907), and Hunt v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 205 U.S. 322 (1907), to support the plaintiff-viewpoint
approach. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 742–44; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 11, § 3703, at 541, 551.
82. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 551–52.
83. Id. at 552.
84. 130 U.S. 167 (1889); see Hoffman v. Vulcan Materials Co., 19 F. Supp.
2d 475, 480–81 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (noting that proponents of the either-
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versy as not only the money judgment requested, but also under certain circumstances, the “increased or diminished value
of the property directly affected by the relief prayed.”85 While
this decision lends insight into the Court’s amount-incontroversy determination, the language was dicta and did not
bind future Court decisions.86 Other circuit courts cite Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee,87 an interstate water pollution dispute, as
supporting the either-viewpoint approach.88 This case held that
“[t]he considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate
waters would seem to put beyond question the jurisdictional
amount.”89 As one commentator noted, the Court in City of
Milwaukee cited to Glenwood, Ward, a Tenth Circuit opinion, a
federal practice treatise, and law review commentary, but explained that “reading the Court’s string cites like tea leaves is a
dubious method of legal scholarship.”90 The dictum of the
Court’s decision in City of Milwaukee appears to support an either-viewpoint approach, but this esoteric language fails to
provide decisive authority.91
Prior to the Court’s decision in City of Milwaukee, a uniform framework for valuing injunctions failed to emerge and
resolving this discord became even more difficult in 1948 with
the passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).92 Section 1447(d) prohibits
the appeal of federal court decisions that remand cases to state
court.93 Although implemented with the laudatory goal of moving cases along on the merits and reducing protracted jurisdictional litigation,94 it had the ancillary side effect of freezing in
viewpoint rule rely on Smith because no Supreme Court case “definitively establishes their test”).
85. Smith, 130 U.S. at 175.
86. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (citing
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821)) (acknowledging that
dicta, although persuasive, are not controlling).
87. 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
88. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 393–94 (7th Cir.
1979) (noting that City of Milwaukee provides important but cryptic direction);
cf. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F.2d 384, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting the per se approach taken by the City of Milwaukee Court).
89. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 98.
90. McInnis, supra note 5, at 1042.
91. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 566 (“[T]his dictum can
be read as a cryptic suggestion that a federal court may take a view for jurisdictional amount purposes from the perspective of either party.”).
92. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006).
94. See Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim
and Pendent Party Cases, 41 VAND. L. REV. 923, 997 & n.352 (1988).
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place injunction valuation jurisprudence. This is because appellate review is not possible from decisions by federal court
judges, such as occurred in McCauley, remanding cases for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction.95
No injunction valuation technique finds direct support in
congressional intent or Supreme Court holdings.96 Consequently, it is not surprising that lower courts struggle to fashion a
uniform valuation procedure, especially given that their only
guidance, as outlined in this Part, is to protect out-of-state litigants while simultaneously limiting the breadth of diversity jurisdiction. In response, courts have fashioned two leading approaches to injunction valuation. The next Part examines these
approaches and explains why neither method comprehensively
adheres to the considerations that shaped diversity jurisdiction.
II. DRAWBACKS TO THE CURRENT INJUNCTION
VALUATION FRAMEWORK
The viewpoint from which to value the amount in controversy is a particularly thorny issue.97 The federal circuit courts
have been left to fashion their own approach to valuing injunctive relief, due to a lack of Supreme Court direction.98 Two primary techniques have arisen,99 and this leaves litigants uncertain as to their prospects of federal court admittance.100
95. Section 1447(d) limits the number of cases eligible for appellate review.
It does not, however, completely preclude such review. See infra Part III.C.
96. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 392–94 (7th Cir.
1979) (describing the difficulty courts have had in deciding upon a valuation
method in suits for injunctive relief ).
97. See Recent Case, Amount in Controversy; Suit to Set Aside Workmen’s
Compensation Award, 46 MINN. L. REV. 960, 962–63 (1962) (“Since the inception of the amount in controversy requirement for diversity suits, questions
concerning the factors to be considered in determining the jurisdictional amount
have plagued the courts.”); Note, The Effect of the Horton Case on the Determination of the Amount in Controversy Under Statutes Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 200, 200 (1962) (“The determination of the ‘value
of the matter in controversy’ is a continuing problem of federal jurisdiction.”).
98. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 537–66 (describing the
various approaches taken by federal circuit courts); id. § 3703, at 538 (“The
leading [Supreme Court] case on the point is so cryptic—and so old—that it
sheds little if any light on the answer to this question.”).
99. Eleven of the twelve circuits purport to follow either the plaintiff or
either-party viewpoints. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text.
100. See Comment, Federal Jurisdictional Amount Requirement in Injunction Suits, 49 YALE L.J. 274, 284 (1939) (explaining that litigants may be left
“somewhat in the dark as to their prospects of gaining admittance to the federal courts”).
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To clarify the issue, this Part analyzes the two amount-incontroversy approaches and explains why each is less than satisfactory—indicating that large-scale reconsideration of the injunction valuation framework is necessary. More specifically, it
argues that the plaintiff-viewpoint approach fails to properly
gauge the value of the litigated object and promotes out-of-state
prejudices, while the either-party viewpoint overextends federal jurisdiction in such a fashion that it conflicts with the historical scope of the diversity statute.
A. PLAINTIFF-VIEWPOINT APPROACH
The plaintiff-viewpoint approach to injunction valuation
considers only the value to the plaintiff of the right sought.101
Judging the amount in controversy from the plaintiff’s viewpoint is logical considering the plaintiff is the “master of the
claim”102 and because the sum alleged by the plaintiff controls
if made in good faith.103 Further, the plaintiff-viewpoint approach is consistent with the “well-pleaded complaint” rule that
prevents plaintiffs from creating federal subject-matter jurisdiction merely by anticipating defendant defenses.104 In other
words, the plaintiff-viewpoint approach prevents a defendant,
merely by recasting the cost of injunctive relief, to defeat the
plaintiff’s choice-of-law forum.105
101. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 734 –36.
102. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Lonny
S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1217, 1244 (2008) (noting the long-standing principal that the plaintiff is
master of the complaint).
103. See Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,
288 (1938).
104. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)
(“[A] suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States only
when the plaintiff ’s statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based
upon those laws or that Constitution.”). The well-pleaded complaint rule is typically applied in federal-question cases, Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392, but
the Supreme Court recently explained its application in the diversity context.
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005)
(“When the well-pleaded complaint contains at least one claim that satisfies the
amount-in-controversy requirement . . . the district court, beyond all question,
has original jurisdiction over that claim.” (emphasis added)). This Note adopts
the Court’s use of the well-pleaded complaint rule in Allapattah Services and
refers only to the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s amount-in-controversy pleadings.
105. Cf. Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 99 (stating that “the plaintiff would be
master of nothing” if the defendant could recast the jurisdictional requirements); Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 294 (explaining that the plaintiff ’s claim
“fixes the right of the defendant to remove”).
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Supporting the plaintiff-viewpoint approach is the principle that federal courts are limited in jurisdiction.106 Because
the plaintiff-viewpoint rule considers only the pecuniary value
of the injunction to the plaintiff and disregards the defendant’s
cost of compliance,107 fewer cases are eligible for federal jurisdiction—supporting Congress’s desire to limit the number of
diversity suits obtaining federal jurisdiction.108 Courts that
analyze the jurisdictional amount from only the plaintiff’s
viewpoint limit federal jurisdiction and simplify the valuation
inquiry by considering the amount-in-controversy from only one
party’s perspective.
The plaintiff-viewpoint’s ease of application and greater
certainty of results are often cited as underlying rationales for
the rule.109 Some courts find, however, that excluding variables
from the valuation inquiry causes parties to contest what factors are permitted, potentially complicating the jurisdictional
determination.110 Further, because the plaintiff-viewpoint
amount-in-controversy inquiry only examines the benefit to the
plaintiff of the right requested and fails to consider the defendant’s cost of compliance, the approach potentially understates
the true value of the litigated object.111
Casting the value of the litigated object from the plaintiff’s
viewpoint is not only facially unfair to defendants, but it also
contradicts the diversity statute’s attempts to protect against
out-of-state biases. This is because plaintiffs’ lawyers are often
familiar with the state forum they choose and know how to
maximize local biases, which leads to greater plaintiff success

106. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994) (noting that federal courts are limited in jurisdiction); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (same).
107. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 735–36.
108. See Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 288 (“The intent . . . to restrict federal
jurisdiction in controversies between citizens of different states has always
been rigorously enforced by the courts.”).
109. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 550; Dobie, supra
note 3, at 736.
110. Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907, 914 –15 (S.D. Cal. 1942)
(explaining that the plaintiff-viewpoint model “is not always easy to apply” in
the context of considering the applicability of liquidated damages (citing Smith
v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175 (1889))).
111. See Alfonso v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724, 727
(5th Cir. 1962) (refusing to consider the value of the object of litigation from
the defendant’s perspective).
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rates.112 A recent survey of diversity cases showed that plaintiff
win rates dropped from seventy-one percent in original diversity cases to thirty-four percent in cases removed to federal
court.113 The authors of the study noted that state biases are
not the only factors driving these results,114 but since the plaintiff-viewpoint approach only considers the value of the injunction to the plaintiff, fewer cases are eligible for removal jurisdiction and, in turn, fewer cases have the opportunity to avoid
potentially biased state courts.
Latent biases also arise in the context of counterclaims.
Suppose, for example, that Happy Apple Orchard files suit
against ABC Electric in a plaintiff-viewpoint jurisdiction. Since
the court will only consider the value to the plaintiff of the
right it seeks to protect, the power plant cannot remove the
case to federal court unless the plaintiff’s claim is for more
than the jurisdictional amount. Not only are defendants forced
to litigate amongst in-state biases in this scenario, but they also must do so when possessing a compulsory counterclaim for
more than the jurisdictional amount. The practical implication
of this restriction is that if ABC Electric has evidence that
Happy Apple’s claim is unfounded and wishes to file a compulsory counterclaim that exceeds the jurisdictional amount,115 it
cannot use this claim to satisfy the minimum amount-incontroversy requirement.116 This inequity against out-of-state
litigants, which is ameliorated when courts look beyond the initial claimant’s perspective,117 illustrates how the plaintiffviewpoint framework fails to adhere to the Framers’ desire for
diversity jurisdiction to protect against out-of-state biases.
The plaintiff-viewpoint approach limits the number of cases reaching federal courts. Although this comports with Congress’s general desire to limit federal jurisdiction, the approach
fails to consider the defendant’s cost of compliance and contra112. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 599 (1998).
113. Id. at 594 tbl.1.
114. See id. at 599 (noting disparities in court quality and differences in
procedural law as also affecting plaintiff victory rates).
115. ABC Electric would likely require evidence from prior proceedings
that plaintiff ’s allegations are false. For example, see Lothschuetz v. Carpenter,
898 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1990), where the court issued an injunction to prevent
disparagement of property and for defamation causing harm to a business.
116. See infra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 160–65 and accompanying text.
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dicts the principle that diversity jurisdiction protects against
out-of-state biases. These drawbacks are further exacerbated in
the context of counterclaims. As the next section examines, the
either-party approach ameliorates these inequitable weaknesses, but it does so in such a fashion that overly extends federal jurisdiction.
B. EITHER-PARTY APPROACH
The either-party approach, an alternative to the plaintiff
viewpoint approach, assesses the value of the litigated object
from the perspective of either the plaintiff or the defendant.118
Proponents of the either-party approach argue that the diversity statute is silent regarding how courts should interpret its
wording.119 For example, nothing in the diversity statute’s text,
through the use of the words “sum,” “value,” or “matter in controversy,” suggest it pertains only to the plaintiff’s viewpoint.120 The statute is silent, which leads to ambiguity, and
under such circumstances interpretation should, among other
things, mirror the history of the statute.121 Given this premise,
endorsement of the either-party viewpoint is plausible considering it allows defendants a greater opportunity to remove cases to federal court and avoid in-state biases.122
Additionally, the either-party approach gives judges greater flexibility and discretion, while not blinding them to the true
amount in controversy.123 In valuing the actual object of litigation from the viewpoint of either litigant, and not just its value
to the plaintiff, the either-party viewpoint promotes equity and
fairness. It does, however, have the side effect of increasing the
number of cases eligible for federal court since consideration of
the defendant’s cost of compliance occurs.124
118. See Miller v. First Serv. Corp., 84 F.2d 680, 681 (8th Cir. 1936) (explaining the test for jurisdiction as the amount the plaintiff claims to recover
or the sum the defendant will lose).
119. See Brief for Petitioners at 6–7, Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 534 U.S.
1126 (2002) (No. 01-896), 2002 WL 955476, at *6–7.
120. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 10–11, McCauley, 534 U.S. 1126 (No. 01-896), 2002 WL 939555, at *10–11.
121. See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373–75 (2006)
(using the history of the Bankruptcy Clause in reaching a decision).
122. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
123. See McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1979)
(explaining that federal courts should not be blinded “to the realities of the
magnitude of the controversy” (citation omitted)).
124. See id.
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The either-party rule admittedly allows a greater number
of cases to be brought in federal court.125 It is important to note,
however, that the additional cases achieving federal diversity
jurisdiction are those in which the defendant’s cost of compliance is greater than the diversity statute’s jurisdictional
threshold amount. And this comports with one objective of diversity jurisdiction—providing a neutral forum to out-of-state
defendants with sizeable disputes.126
The either-party viewpoint is not, however, without drawbacks. One such issue is its presumption that plaintiffs can determine defendants’ costs of compliance. In some instances, especially antitrust cases that enumerate precise injunctive
orders,127 ascertaining the defendant’s cost of compliance may
be straightforward. For example, in the unfair competition case
Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., the plaintiff sought to enjoin Microsoft from coupling its Internet browser and computer software programs.128 Since the defendant, upon an adverse decision, could no longer market its software suite as developed,
the amount in controversy was the cost associated with designing, developing, and testing a version of the software that
would comply with the injunction.129 Because the defendant only had one way to comply with the injunction, determining the
cost of compliance was relatively straightforward.
Plaintiffs’ determination of the defendants’ cost of compliance is not always so simple. In nuisance cases, for example,
judges often allow the defendant to mitigate an offending action
however it sees fit.130 For example, suppose Happy Apple Orchard files suit in an either-party district to enjoin the defend125. See McInnis, supra note 5, at 1032 (explaining that the eitherviewpoint rule makes it easier for defendants to remove cases to federal court).
126. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 558–61 (“[T]he purpose of
a jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement—to keep trivial cases
away from the federal court system—is satisfied when the case is worth a
large sum of money to either party.”). But see Redish, supra note 24, at 1801–
03 (suggesting concerns other than restricting federal dockets as shaping jurisdictional rules).
127. See Keith N. Hylton, Remedies, Antitrust Law, and Microsoft: Comment on Shapiro, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 774 (2009) (explaining the precise
nature of antitrust injunctive remedies).
128. Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000).
129. See id. at 1198–99 (approximating the cost of designing, developing, and
testing a new version that would comply with the injunction at $58.5 million).
130. See, e.g., Schlotfelt v. Vinton Farmers’ Supply Co., 109 N.W.2d 695,
699 (Iowa 1961) (ordering the defendant to cease operation unless it could continue to operate without disturbing plaintiff ).
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ant’s pollution. If the plaintiff’s proposed benefit, measured by
the increase in property value or improved apple yield, is less
than the diversity statute’s threshold amount, Happy Apple
Orchard can still obtain federal jurisdiction if the defendant’s
cost of compliance is greater than the statutory requirement.131
While Happy Apple Orchard could determine ABC Electric’s
cost of compliance by dividing its annual profit by the number
of days the injunction prevented operation of the factory, the
defendant would likely be given permission to mitigate pollution by alternative means. Instead of closing the factory, the defendant may choose to install clean-coal technology or engage
in a cap-and-trade scheme. In other words, the plaintiff’s calculation of the defendant’s cost of compliance, under an eitherparty framework, is speculative and may conflict with the wellpleaded complaint doctrine since it requires the plaintiff to
surmise not only the defendant’s planned mitigation technique,
but also the cost of such action.132
The above-outlined example illustrates the potential ambiguities that exist if plaintiffs plead based on the defendants’
cost of compliance. This is somewhat mitigated, however, by
the pleading framework established in Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.133 The standard allows dismissal or
remand to state court only if the plaintiff’s allegations “appear
to a legal certainty” to be less than the jurisdictional amount.134
Generally speaking, it is very difficult for defendants to overcome the “legal certainty” standard.135 Although the “legal certainty” standard supports the either-party pleading requirements, it appears to conflict with the underlying principle that
federal courts are limited in jurisdiction.136

131. See, e.g., McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 595 F.2d 389, 391–95 (7th
Cir. 1979) (determining the amount in controversy from either the plaintiff ’s
or defendant’s viewpoint).
132. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153
(1908) (limiting pleading to plaintiff ’s cause of action and not defendant’s
response).
133. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
134. Id. at 289.
135. See, e.g., Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 511–13 (7th Cir.
2006) (discussing the difficulty of overcoming the Red Cab Co. standard); Duchesne v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 758 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[W]hile it seems
unlikely that [appellant] will recover [the jurisdictional amount], we cannot
say that it is legally certain.”).
136. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (noting the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the presumption that a claim lies
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Additionally, the Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly137 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal138 may make the either viewpoint approach untenable. Twombly heightened pleading requirements from “conceivable to plausible”139 and plaintiffs
must now make “a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.”140 Although no federal cases or scholarly commentaries have addressed the application of Twombly to
the amount-in-controversy pleading requirements and the Red
Cab Co. “legal certainty” test, it seems reasonable that the
Court will reexamine this standard—especially given Iqbal’s
extension of Twombly to “all civil actions.”141 Not only does the
“either-viewpoint approach” potentially conflict with the
Twombly pleading requirements, but it is in disagreement with
the historical basis—to limit jurisdiction—of the well-pleaded
complaint doctrine.142
One objective of requiring plaintiffs to plead with specificity is to improve judicial efficiency.143 The well-pleaded complaint doctrine serves as a quick guidepost for resolving juris-

outside that jurisdiction, and that the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of overcoming that presumption).
137. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
138. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009).
139. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
140. Arthur D. Hellman, Another Voice for the “Dialogue”: Federal Courts
as a Litigation Course, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 767 (2009) (quoting Gregory
P. Joseph, Federal Litigation—Where Did It Go Off Track?, LITIGATION, Summer 2008, at 5).
141. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)); see also Allison Sirica, Case Comment,
The New Federal Pleading Standard: Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 62 FLA. L. REV. 547,
550 (2010) (identifying questions about Twombly’s “applicability, implementation, and scope,” and noting uncertainty before Iqbal if “the Court intended to
confine the heightened pleading standard to complex litigation, such as the
antitrust claim in Twombly, or whether the heightened pleading standard applied more generally to all civil actions”).
142. See Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purpose of Federal
Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 653 (1987) (noting that one of
the well-pleaded complaint rule’s three purposes is to limit the amount of federal litigation).
143. See Roger A. Ragazzo, Reconsidering the Artful Pleading Doctrine, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 273, 327–28 (1993) (“The well-pleaded complaint rule avoids
the large costs of case-by-case investigation by fairly approximating the cases
that belong in federal courts.”).
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dictional disputes144 and allows litigants to determine the proper forum at the outset of litigation.145 In other words, the doctrine acts as a means to improve judicial efficiency by streamlining the jurisdictional venue determination.146 Under the
either-party viewpoint, however, it is not difficult to imagine a
scenario in which the plaintiff alleges the jurisdictional threshold is met, while the defendant claims its cost of compliance is
actually far less. In such situations, it is common for the judge
to order limited discovery as to whether the requisite jurisdictional threshold is met,147 which further demonstrates that the
either-viewpoint model curtails judicial efficiency.
The either-party approach values the true object of litigation. As such, it eliminates the biases against out-of-state litigants that are prevalent in the plaintiff-viewpoint approach. It,
however, greatly extends federal jurisdiction and prevents certainty in pleading, neither of which characterize an ideal valuation framework. A solution, as Part III proposes, is the movingparty approach. It both protects against out-of-state biases and
extends jurisdiction in a lesser manner than the either-party
viewpoint.
III. THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH: A BETTER
VALUATION TECHNIQUE
Part II examined how the plaintiff and either-party viewpoints are undesirable because they fail to either value the
amount at controversy from the perspective of both litigants,
thereby perpetuating in-state biases, or because of the principle
144. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (“[T]he well-pleaded complaint rule makes sense as a quick
rule of thumb.”).
145. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1989) (explaining that “a major
justification for applying the [well-pleaded complaint] rule” is “to have a mechanism for deciding quickly whether a case falls within the competence of a federal trial court”).
146. See Mary P. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption,
Removal, and the Arising-Under Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV 812, 821–22 (1986).
147. See, e.g., Rippee v. Bos. Mkt. Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 982, 983 (S.D. Cal.
2005) (ordering the parties to engage in ninety days of limited discovery to determine the amount in controversy); Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., 91 F. Supp.
2d 1196, 1197–98 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (permitting limited oral argument to ascertain jurisdictional amount). But see Walsh v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 264 F.
Supp. 514, 515 (E.D. Ky. 1967) (“Where there is doubt as to federal jurisdiction, the doubt should be construed in favor of remanding the case to the State
court where there is no doubt as to its jurisdiction.”).
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that federal courts are limited in jurisdiction. This Part proposes endorsement of the moving-party approach as a way to mitigate these drawbacks. Although the technique is a minority
valuation approach, drawing support almost exclusively from
the District of Kentucky,148 it nonetheless is of sound rationale
and adheres to the historical context of diversity jurisdiction.
This is because the moving-party approach assesses the actual
object of litigation from the perspective of both parties149 and
circumvents limited jurisdiction and well-pleaded complaint issues.150 Additionally, the moving-party approach avoids a race
to the courthouse pleading scenario.
This Part also outlines two ways in which implementation
of the moving-party approach is feasible. The first is for courts
to interpret the “original jurisdiction” language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 as conferring jurisdiction to the moving-party approach.
An alternative, and more straightforward approach, however,
is a legislative amendment to § 1332 that would specifically allow for the moving-party approach.
A. ADVANTAGES OF THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH
The moving-party approach values the amount in controversy from the plaintiff’s viewpoint when establishing original
jurisdiction and the defendant’s viewpoint upon removal.151 A
benefit of such an approach, when compared to the plaintiffviewpoint model, is that it values the true amount in controversy.152 Stated another way, it takes into account the defendants’
compliance costs in removal settings, thereby considering the
totality of the circumstances and also mitigating in-state biases.
Additionally, the moving-party approach prevents a raceto-the-courthouse scenario that arises in the context of counterclaims. In most jurisdictions, courts will not consider the value
of a compulsory counterclaim for purposes of meeting the diversity statute’s amount-in-controversy requirement.153 For exam148. See, e.g., Bedell v. H.R.C. Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732, 735 (E.D. Ky. 1981)
(implementing the moving-party approach); Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div. Consol. Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.D. Ky. 1973) (same).
149. See Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735.
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735.
152. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 562–63.
153. See Mesa Indus., Inc. v. Eaglebrook Prods., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 323, 325
(D. Ariz. 1997) (holding that a compulsory counterclaim cannot be used to satisfy the jurisdictional amount); Cont’l Carriers, Inc. v. Goodpasture, 169 F.
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ple, in Ingram v. Sterling154 the plaintiff filed suit in state court
alleging $2650 in damages stemming from an automobile accident. The defendant subsequently filed a counterclaim for
$15,450, well above the then-jurisdictional amount of $3000,
and removed to federal court.155 Upon review, the federal court
remanded the case after concluding that a counterclaim, even
though compulsory, cannot establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction.156
Strictly construing the removal statute appears to be the
impetus for this interpretation. One commentator noted that
such a practice is legally sound because it restricts the removal
statute to its historical context.157 It “is, however, of questionable justice.”158 This is because denying jurisdiction to a compulsory counterclaim that satisfies the jurisdictional amount
means that the litigant who wins the race to the courthouse is
able to dictate forum selection. Essentially, a plaintiff asserting
a small claim can force the opposing party, with a cognizable
federal diversity claim, to litigate in state court since counterclaims cannot satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.159
Returning to the orchard example, suppose both parties intend to file a request for injunction: the plaintiff to enjoin defendant’s pollution and the defendant to enjoin plaintiff’s defamation. Under the plaintiff-viewpoint approach, since the
Supp. 602, 603–04 (M.D. Ga. 1959) (same); Nat’l Upholstery Co. v. Corley, 144
F. Supp. 658, 661 (M.D.N.C. 1956) (“This court accepts without question the
general proposition that the complaint normally determines the removability
by the nonresident defendant and also agrees that a counterclaim is not available to increase the amount involved in the litigation.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Finding Room for State Class Actions in a Post-CAFA World: The Case of the Counterclaim Class Action, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 193, 233 (2007) (noting that original
claims, not counterclaims, establish federal jurisdiction). But see Swallow &
Assocs. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(“Because the damages pled in the defendant’s compulsory counterclaim exceed the amount in controversy prerequisite to federal diversity jurisdiction,
this case was removed providently.”). A counterclaim arising out of the same
“transaction or occurrence” as the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim
is a compulsory claim and requires assertion in the pending case or it is barred
from subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S.
467, 469 n.1 (1974) (holding that a compulsory counterclaim must be asserted
or “is thereafter barred”).
154. 141 F. Supp. 786, 786 (W.D. Ark. 1956).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 789.
157. Recent Decisions, 45 VA. L. REV. 737, 738 (1959).
158. Id.
159. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3706, at 730–33.
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court only values the amount in controversy from the plaintiff’s
perspective,160 jurisdiction is established by the party whose
complaint is first filed. Conversely, under the moving-party approach whether the orchard or coal-fired power plant is the
first party to the courthouse doors has no bearing on the forum
for litigation. This is because ABC Electric can remove to federal court based on its compliance costs and then use federal
supplemental jurisdiction to assert its compulsory counterclaim.161
To mitigate this courthouse race, a straightforward solution would be to allow defendants to establish jurisdiction
based on the value of their compulsory counterclaim. A problem
with such an approach, however, is that doing so then makes
federal removal dependent upon each state court’s definition of
permissive and compulsory claims.162 The practical consequence of such a method is that removal then becomes dependent upon state court rules, thereby eliminating uniformity in
the federal system. An alternative solution, of course, is the
moving-party approach, because it allows defendants to establish federal jurisdiction based on their cost of compliance and
then assert a compulsory counterclaim under federal supplemental jurisdiction. Admittedly, the compulsory counterclaim
will only achieve federal jurisdiction if the defendant’s cost of
complying with the plaintiff’s request is greater than the jurisdictional amount. Such a rule, however, not only circumvents
unfair treatment of defendants and gamesmanship by plaintiffs, but it maintains certainty in pleading that would otherwise be lost if counterclaims could be used to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
The primary advantages of the moving-party approach
over the plaintiff-viewpoint model are its consideration of the
amount in controversy from all litigants’ perspectives and its
amelioration of the race-to-the-courthouse scenario. Although
the either-party viewpoint also mitigates these drawbacks, it is
less preferable than the moving-party approach because it overly extends diversity jurisdiction. Under an either party framework, the plaintiff is only required to meet the Red Cab Co. “le160. See Dobie, supra note 3, at 734.
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
162. See Meridian Aviation Serv. v. Sun Jet Int’l, 886 F. Supp. 613, 615
(S.D. Tex. 1995) (“[I]f compulsory counterclaims were considered [for purposes
of jurisdiction], federal subject-matter jurisdiction would be reliant on state
law distinctions between compulsory and permissive counterclaims.”).
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gal certainty” standard for federal court admittance, and this
inquiry is far less searching than the preponderance-of-theevidence removal burden present under the moving-party approach.163 Further, the moving-party approach does not allow
plaintiffs to assert the defendants’ anticipated compliance costs
as grounds for federal court admittance, which adheres to the
well-pleaded complaint doctrine.164 As such, from a judicial efficiency standpoint, the moving-party approach is more suitable
than the either-party approach because the party seeking jurisdiction bears the burden of producing evidence that jurisdiction is proper.165
Courts should endorse the moving-party approach because
it promotes fairness and equity in the adjudication of diversity
jurisdiction injunction suits while still adhering to the principle
that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As one
court noted, the moving-party approach is “preferable from the
standpoint of logic, practicality, and [in] achieving the policies
of the statutes creating removal jurisdiction.”166 Justification
for endorsing the moving-party framework is even stronger after addressing the improper criticism it has garnered.
B. UNFOUNDED CRITICISM OF THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH
The moving-party approach is a minority injunction valuation technique. As such, relatively little commentary is available outside the Sixth Circuit—the only jurisdiction where the
viewpoint from which to value injunctions remains unsettled.167
The commentary that is available, however, is of questionable
rationale, especially given the current federal court pleading
framework.
163. Cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale
of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1571–72 (2008) (“[T]he courts,
and especially the appellate courts, markedly appear to be converging on the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, which requires a more-likely-than
not showing. This still-tough approach against removal jurisdiction is seemingly incongruent with the anything-goes flavor of the St. Paul test for original
jurisdiction.” (footnotes omitted)).
164. Cf. Bedell v. H.R.C. Ltd., 522 F. Supp. 732, 735 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (describing original jurisdiction as established by the plaintiff ).
165. See Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir.
1969) (explaining that the burden of removal lies on the defendant).
166. Bedell, 522 F. Supp. at 735.
167. See McIntire v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F. Supp. 2d 911, 920 (S.D. Ohio
2001) (“District courts within the Sixth Circuit have recognized that the law is
unsettled regarding whose viewpoint . . . should be considered in determining
the value of an injunction case.”).
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For example, in Southern States Police Benevolent Ass’n v.
Second Chance Body Armor, Inc. the court criticized the moving-party approach because it “allow[s] either party to easily
avoid the rule of non-aggregation.”168 Essentially, the court was
concerned that such a framework would allow defendants to
join claims in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount. This
decision, however, was issued prior to two key changes in federal subject-matter jurisprudence. First, in Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Allapattah Services, Inc., the Court held that so long as one
claim satisfies the amount-in-controversy determination for diversity jurisdiction, joinder of claims by other plaintiffs may occur under supplemental jurisdiction even if they do not independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount.169 Additionally,
with the 2005 passage of the Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA),170 defendants can now join class action claims in order
to satisfy the jurisdictional amount for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.171 Subsequent to Second Chance’s criticism of the
moving-party approach,172 both the judicial and legislative
branches altered their stance on the practice of claim aggregation, thereby undercutting Second Chance’s criticism.
Commentators also note that the moving-party approach
can cause anomalous results. For example, a case originally
brought in federal court could be remanded to state court due
to the plaintiff’s failure to allege damages sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional amount. Thereafter, however, the defendant
could still remove the case back to federal court, citing his or
her compliance costs as sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount.173 Although this potentially circuitous route exists,174
it is likely no more than a theoretical argument since defend168. S. States Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc.,
336 F. Supp. 2d 731, 736 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
169. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005).
170. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
171. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2006) (“In any class action, the claims of
the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000 . . . .”).
172. Second Chance, 336 F. Supp. at 736.
173. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3703, at 563–64.
174. The law of the case doctrine, which notes that a decision by the highest court is final, may prevent the defendant from removing the case back to
federal court if the jurisdictional amount was previously found insufficient by
that court. Compare Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75, 85 n.1 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that courts would reject the claim if raised
again), with Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 385 (2003) (holding that
the doctrine does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to reexamination).
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ants that wish to remain in federal court are unlikely to challenge the plaintiff’s jurisdiction.175 Admittedly, the court can
perform a sua sponte examination of the amount in controversy, but this is unlikely to result in remand to state court because upon such an examination federal jurisdiction is proper
“if it appears that for any member . . . the matter in controversy
is of the value of the jurisdictional amount.”176 This language
appears to afford jurisdiction for moving-party injunction cases,
but the approach, according to some, still contradicts the removal statute’s requirement that federal courts possess original
jurisdiction in cases removed from state court.177
For example, in Snow v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiffs, in
state court, requested damages and injunctive relief valuing
eleven dollars per plaintiff, whereas the defendant’s cost of
compliance was well above the jurisdictional amount.178 The
court denied the defendant’s request for removal, stating it is
“well-settled” that the federal court cannot exercise removal jurisdiction, absent a specific statutory exception, unless the case
could have originally been brought in federal court by the
plaintiff.179 Strict adherence to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 seems to be
the primary concern regarding endorsement of the movingparty approach.180
This strict adherence to the removal statute’s “original jurisdiction” language, however, seems overly doctrinal given
that courts look beyond the plaintiff ’s complaint when making

175. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939) (noting that the damages outlined in the complaint are left unchallenged unless the court has
doubt regarding the “good faith of the allegations”).
176. Id. But see Saint Paul Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–
89 (1938) (acknowledging that jurisdiction is improper only if it appears
beyond a “legal certainty” that the claim is for less than the threshold amount,
but remaining silent regarding the viewpoint for this determination).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court
of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the United
States . . . .”).
178. Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 788 (9th Cir. 1977).
179. Id. at 789.
180. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Orthodontists v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., No.
4:07-CV-351 (CEJ), 2007 WL 1687259, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 28, 2007) (noting
removal is proper only after examining the plaintiff ’s pleadings); cf. City of
Chi. v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 163 (1997) (“The propriety of removal thus depends on whether the case originally could have been filed in
federal court.”).
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amount-in-controversy examinations after removal requests.181
Often this occurs when plaintiffs, filing in state court and who
are not concerned with requirements for federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, leave the complaint silent as to the amount in controversy.182 Although some federal courts will remand cases to
state court under these circumstances,183 most courts look to
the removal petition184 or undertake an independent examination of the amount in controversy to determine if jurisdiction is
proper.185
There is sound rationale in favor of allowing courts to
make such an ad hoc inquiry beyond the plaintiff’s complaint.
One basis for such a practice is that it prevents plaintiffs from
trying to evade federal jurisdiction by omitting factually relevant allegations.186 For strategic reasons, the Happy Apple
Orchard attorney may want to bring a claim against ABC Electric in state court. A jury selected from the surrounding community, many of whom are rural farmers, may be more sympathetic to the orchard owner than a federally selected jury would
be. In hopes of keeping the claim in state court, the complaint
may remain silent regarding the citizenship of the parties or
the amount in controversy. Further, some court rules prohibit
plaintiffs from pleading specific damage amounts in state
181. See Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div. Consol. Foods Corp.,
369 F. Supp. 766, 768 (1973) (indicating that the court may look to the petition
for removal when the complaint fails to mention monetary damages); MOORE,
supra note 7, ¶ 0.92[3.-2].
182. Family Motor Inn, Inc., 369 F. Supp. at 768.
183. See, e.g., Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 287 F.2d 252, 254
(5th Cir. 1961) (“It is . . . settled that a case non-removable on the complaint,
when commenced, cannot be converted into a removable one by the evidence of
the defendant or by an order of the court . . . .” (citing Great N. Ry. Co. v.
Alexandar, 246 U.S. 276, 281 (1918))).
184. See, e.g., Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir.
2001) (“If the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the complaint, the court should look to the notice of removal and may require evidence
relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was removed.”);
Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 282 n.1
(3d Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that the complaint fails to allege diversity jurisdiction, but deciding that federal jurisdiction is proper given the allegation in
the removal petition).
185. See, e.g., Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 679 F.2d 131, 133 (7th Cir.
1982) (disposing of subject-matter jurisdiction after the court’s inquiry into the
defendant’s damages).
186. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3734, at 667 (4th ed. 2009) (“[S]uch a limitation would encourage a plaintiff who wished to remain in state court to plead in a way that
would obscure any basis for removal.”).
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court.187 Without the ability to look beyond the face of the complaint to establish “original jurisdiction,” unfair dismissal of
cases qualifying for removal jurisdiction occurs.
Fortunately, the predominant federal court practice allows
courts to look beyond the face of the plaintiff’s complaint and
consider factors in the record as a whole.188 This approach is
sound given that there would be little point in requesting a
“short and plain statement” supporting the grounds for removal
in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) if a court could not consider the statement when gauging the propriety of removal.189 For example, if
a plaintiff pleads with an ad damnum clause,190 quantifying
the extent of its damages, it would be illogical to prevent the
defendant from making an inquiry as to the actual amount in
controversy. Otherwise, all litigants wishing to remain in state
court could plead less than the jurisdictional amount, and removal to federal court would then be impossible. This is why
defendants are allowed to look beyond the complaint and notice
of removal to establish removal jurisdiction.191 Section 1446(b)
also supports this practice and allows removal evidence
through “stipulation, pre-removal discovery or other means.”192
Additionally, possession of jurisdictional information to support
a viable claim is often only in the possession of one party,193
and thus it seems logical to allow establishment of jurisdictional facts by the party who controls that information, as opposed
to only the plaintiff.
Not only will a court look beyond the original complaint
upon a request for removal, but courts will do the same in the
context of amended complaints. For example, in Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., the plaintiff filed suit in state court
originally alleging $1500 in damages—well below the $2000
statutory requirement in 1904—but later amended the com187. See, e.g., Burk v. Med. Savs. Ins. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067 (D.
Ariz. 2004) (holding that the district court could look beyond the face of the
complaint to establish original jurisdiction given that Arizona state court rules
prohibit plaintiffs from pleading unliquidated damages).
188. See, e.g., Baccus v. Parrish, 45 F.3d 958, 960–61 (5th Cir. 1995)
(“[C]ourts will typically look beyond the face of a complaint to determine
whether removal is proper.”).
189. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 186, § 3734, at 671.
190. Defined as a statement estimating the amount in controversy from the
plaintiff ’s perspective. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (8th ed. 2004).
191. Hoffman, supra note 102, at 1250.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1261.
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plaint to above the threshold amount.194 The defendant then
removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for
$1700.195 In response, Kirby requested the court to dismiss the
case, arguing it should only consider the original complaint per
the removal statute’s text.196 The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court’s grant of jurisdiction, noting that the plaintiff’s
amendment satisfied the jurisdictional requirement.197
Section 1446(b) echoes this practice, stipulating that a previously unremovable case may be removed within thirty days of
an “amended pleading, motion, order or other paper.”198 It is illogical to think Congress intended for district courts to look
beyond the complaint for renewed removal actions, but did not
intend for similar treatment of original complaints.199 This is
another example of how courts will look beyond the original
face of the complaint when ascertaining the amount in controversy.
The removal statute requires district courts to have original jurisdiction,200 but since courts already look beyond the
original complaint when it is silent as to jurisdictional elements
or upon amendment, it seems logical to allow courts to do the
same for purposes of endorsing the moving-party approach. Especially considering the moving-party approach will reduce instate biases without overly extending federal jurisdiction.
C. IMPLEMENTING THE MOVING-PARTY APPROACH
Endorsement of the moving-party approach is possible
through two different routes. Since federal courts already look
beyond the face of the complaint when assessing the suitability
of removal jurisdiction, implementation of the moving-party
approach can occur without any changes to the statutory
framework. But given that no federal circuit courts have officially endorsed the moving-party approach, implementation
would more likely need to come in the form of a Supreme Court
order. As this section discusses, however, the procedural posture necessary for Supreme Court review is quite rare, and, in
the alternative, Congress should implement the moving-party
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Kirby v. Am. Soda Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141, 141–42 (1904).
Id. at 142.
Id. at 142–43.
Id. at 144.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006).
See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 186, § 3734, at 671.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
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approach through an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
A Supreme Court order can implement the moving-party
approach. The Supreme Court tried resolving the circuit split in
1992 in McCauley, but ultimately had to dismiss the case after
determining that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) precluded appellate review.201 In order for the Court to resolve the injunction valuation dispute, it will require appeal of a case that was dismissed
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as opposed to merely remanded to state court.
In McCauley, multiple state actions filed against Ford were
consolidated for pretrial purposes only.202 The district court
found it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the
case, but the Ninth Circuit granted review, deciding that
§ 1447(d) was inapplicable because the lower court dismissed as
opposed to remanded the action.203 The Supreme Court disagreed with this characterization, commenting during oral argument that consolidation was for pretrial purposes only and
that remand was necessary after the completion of discovery.204
The Court did not issue an opinion in McCauley, but it has previously held that courts hearing multidistrict litigation for pretrial purposes cannot issue binding decisions.205 With that in
mind, it is likely that the Court dismissed McCauley because
the district court was not allowed to make a binding decision on
jurisdiction; rather, it could only remand to state court.
Section 1447(d) does not, however, have to present an insurmountable obstacle to Supreme Court review. With consent
of all parties involved, the transferee jurisdiction can permanently consolidate claims.206 If the litigants in McCauley had
agreed to a consolidated action for more than pretrial discovery
purposes, the Court’s grant of certiorari would have been prov201. Ford Motor Co. v. McCauley, 534 U.S. 1126, 1126 (2002), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 1 (2002); see also In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d
952, 964 –65 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) forbids appellate
review of certain remand orders).
202. See In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank, 264 F.3d at 956.
203. Id. at 957.
204. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 6.
205. See, e.g., Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26, 40 (1998) (noting that the “straightforward” language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) prevents “transferee courts [from] mak[ing] self-assignments”).
206. See, e.g., In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754,
756 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that, notwithstanding Lexecon, a final decision
was proper given that parties consented to a consolidated action).

1962

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1930

ident and the Court could have resolved the injunction valuation circuit split.
Nonetheless, because the procedural posture necessary for
appellate review of the viewpoint from which to value injunctions is quite rare, implementation of the moving-party approach should occur in the form of a congressional amendment.
Such an action would specifically extend federal diversity jurisdiction to the moving-party approach. Although the general
tenor of Congress is to limit the number of diversity claims that
reach federal courts,207 jurisprudential rules are constructed to
prevent forum shopping and other gamesmanship.208 When
necessary, courts devise rules that broaden federal jurisdiction
in order to prevent abusive manipulation of the courts.209
For example, Congress recently passed CAFA and expanded the federal courts’ definition of original jurisdiction.210
Deviating from the $75,000 and complete diversity requirement
of § 1332(a), Congress extended original jurisdiction, in the context of class action suits, to any action where the matter in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 and “any member of a class of
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”211
Endorsement of CAFA demonstrates that Congress will alter
jurisdictional rules to prevent inequities and forum shopping.212
Accordingly, Congress should explicitly amend the diversity and removal statutes to allow defendants to use their compliance costs as a means to satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement. Such an amendment is possible since both diversity jurisdiction and removal are statutorily, as opposed to constitutionally, derived.213 Although a moving-party amendment

207. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 11, § 3701, at 247–48, 265–66.
208. See, e.g., Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990) (acknowledging the impetus of past decisions as preventing forum shopping).
209. For example, once jurisdiction is found, subsequent events will not abrogate it. See Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824).
210. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
212. See Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It
Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 245, 299 (2008) (noting that the primary impetus for CAFA was to curb
venue gamesmanship).
213. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31
(1967) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Strawbridge was
premised on the text of § 1331 and not the Constitution); Hoyt v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 130 F.2d 636, 637 (9th Cir. 1942) (noting that removal is statutori-

2011]

MOVING-PARTY APPROACH

1963

to diversity jurisdiction expands federal jurisdiction, it does so
in a lesser fashion than the either-party approach and prevents
the inequitable race-to-the-courthouse scenario present under
the plaintiff-viewpoint framework. An amendment would curtail gamesmanship, while only marginally expanding jurisdiction.
Moreover, implementation of such a practice would require
no ancillary changes in how courts value the amount in controversy. Jurisdiction-specific valuation practices, such as whether
to value corporate “good will” or future, immature, and contingent claims would remain unchanged. Plaintiffs wishing to litigate in state court would plead according to local procedure,
and defendants could remove to federal court if their compliance costs exceeded the jurisdictional requirement.
The circuit courts lack a uniform injunction valuation
technique for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, but implementing the moving-party approach will ameliorate this discord.
Such action is desirable because uniformity in the federal
courts is not only a topic of extensive scholarly discussion,214
but it is also reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court docket—
seventy percent of which is devoted to addressing legal issues
over which lower courts have differed.215 Facilitation of the
moving-party approach will ameliorate the circuit split and do
so in a fashion that values the true amount in controversy
without overly extending jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The circuit courts are split regarding the viewpoint for injunction valuation, and this creates a jurisprudential model
that leaves litigants uncertain as to their ultimate forum for litigation.216 The plaintiff-viewpoint framework is easy to apply,
but it fails to consider the true value of the litigated object, it
promotes in-state prejudices, and it is susceptible to jurisdictional gamesmanship. Meanwhile, the either-party viewpoint
conflicts with the well-pleaded complaint doctrine and extends
federal diversity jurisdiction in a manner that is inconsistent
ly derived); Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 55, 73 (2008) (same).
214. Compare Lewis, supra note 59, at 227 (advocating for uniformity),
with Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1573 (2008)
(arguing legislation, not federal courts, should establish uniformity).
215. Frost, supra note 214, at 1569.
216. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.

1964

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1930

with the historical context of the diversity statute. The movingparty approach, however, more accurately takes into account
the true value of litigation from the perspective of all parties
and it mitigates in-state prejudices. Further, the moving-party
approach comports with the well-pleaded complaint doctrine
and extends federal diversity jurisdiction in a lesser fashion
than the either-party viewpoint. Because the procedural posture necessary for judicial implementation of the moving-party
approach is quite rare, Congress should amend the diversity
statute so as to specifically implement the moving-party approach.

